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The State's absolute end is to safeguard (or to change) the
external and internal distribution of power; ultimately, this
end must seem meaningless to any universalist religion of
salvation .... The state is an association that claims the
monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, and cannot be
defined in any other manner.
1
Thomas More is known to history as the consummate Englishman,
and his career as a man of affairs-particularly as a lawyer-is part
of the reason for this tradition. No profession is more dear to the
English than that of the common lawyer who gives himself to the
service of his country in Parliament and in the royal service. More did
this. He was a Member of Parliament and a Speaker of the House of
Commons. As Speaker, his brief office was marked by a plea for the
rights of this House that has become part of the legacy of constitu-
tional freedom. He was also Lord Chancellor, one of the first laymen
to hold the highest office open to a commoner. It is scarcely surpris-
ing, therefore, that from the first, it has been taken for granted that
More was a man given to public service. Even his humanism reinforc-
ed this conviction; he seems a classic example of the civic humanist
in the North, and his service in England has almost defined the vita
civile in a nation state.
It is perhaps worth observing, therefore, that there is no book or
essay known to me on More as a philosopher-or theologian-of
public service. His Utopia2 is constantly cited along with Machiavel-
li's Prince3 and Erasmus' treatise on the Christian Prince4 as one of
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the classic statements of Renaissance political philosophy. Yet the
greatest modern student of the Utopia, Father Surtz, makes no men-
tion of More's attitude to the service of the prince in his two volumes
on The Praise of Pleasure' and The Praise of Wisdom,6 even though
both of them are recognized as erudite essays on the philosophy of
this immortal work. Only recently have we had a careful examina-
tion of More's career in the royal service.7 Its author, Professor Elton,
has concluded that More was a man who "fits none of the standard
categories of royal officers."'8 His career appears to have been highly
idiosyncratic and nothing like a conventional pursuit of the cursus
honorum designed to lead to the highest lay office in the realm.
These conclusions have in effect been confirmed by the recent re-
examination of Dr. Elton's work by Professor J.J. Scarisbrick. 9 I find
these views very interesting because they seem to verify certain ideas
that are apparent in some of More's most important early writings,
and they amplify in an important manner our understanding of this
very complex and remarkable personality.
From 1529 to 1535 in England, there transpired certain events,
ultimately enshrined in Statute, that mark a turning point in the
development of the English Constitution." During these years, some-
thing that qualified for description as a sovereign national state was
established. One reason for thinking this to be so is the dilemma it
posed for Thomas More. Dr. Elton describes this remarkable Eng-
lishman as one of the two men in England "who genuinely grasped
the import of events."" The other man was Thomas Cromwell, to
whose administrative and political genius Elton attributes this
"Tudor revolution."'12 The ensuing opposition between More and
Cromwell on the great matter of the King's divorce and the royal
supremacy is a classic confrontation between the advocate of the
national state and the loyalist of an international supra-political
order. It invites us now to reflect on certain views on the nature of
political power expressed by More before he became involved in the
momentous developments surrounding the royal divorce.
5. E. SURTZ, THE PRAISE OF PLEASURE (1957).
6. E. SURTZ, THE PRAISE OF WISDOM (1957).
7. Elton, Thomas More, Councillor, in ST. THOMAS MORE: ACTION AND
CONTEMPLATION 85 (R. Sylvester ed. 1972).
8. Id. at 97.
9. Scarisbrick, Thomas More: The King's 'Good Servant,' 52 THOUGHT 249
(1977).
10. The most important modern account is that of G. ELTON, THE TUDOR
REVOLUTION IN GOVERNMENT (1953).
11. G. ELTON, ENGLAND UNDER THE TUDORS 167 (1955).
12. See note 10 supra.
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More's views show a continuing preoccupation with the respon-
sibilities and legitimation of power. More's concern was shared in
different ways by other thinkers of the day, including Machiavelli,
Claude de Seyssel, and Erasmus. All these men, as Myron Gilmore
has written, "recognized that monarchies like France, Spain, and
England disposed of the decisive power in the world of the sixteenth
century, and they recognized further that that power was being
arbitrarily used, unchecked by the moral laws of the Christian tradi-
tion." 13 Although their emphasis differed with circumstance, the
question of the legitimation of princely power was always fundamen-
tal. Seyssel and Machiavelli were both concerned to increase the
effectiveness of princely authority.14 Seyssel was, however, per-
suaded that one of the conditions essential to the vitality of the
French monarchy was that it submit to the three reins of religion,
justice, and la police. A distinguished authority has recently written
of the "basic presumption" in all of Machiavelli's relevant political
writings that a ruler must govern within a firm institutional
framework to retain the support of the aristocracy and the
populace."
For More and Erasmus, the first priority was the evangelical resto-
ration of a Christian conscience in Europe, and their attitude to
princely power is at once more traditional and, in certain respects,
more radical. Thus, Erasmus' chief political treatise, the Institutio
principis Christiani,5 while in form a humanistic elaboration of the
medieval Mirror of Princes, in fact describes hereditary monarchy as
only the best of the available polities. It is elective monarchy that is
first discussed and implicitly preferred, where selection of the ruler
is bestowed upon the people.
Both these men, especially in the early years of their close famili-
arity, shared political principles that are something like repub-
licanism. It was some time in the first two decades of the century, for
example, that More wrote his epigram on the bestowal of sovereignty
(regnum) by the consent of the people: "Any one man who has
command of many men owes his subjects this: he ought to have
13. M. GILMORE, THE WORLD OF HUMANISM 137 (1952).
14. See, e.g., the discussion by Major, The Renaissance Monarchy as Seen by
Erasmus, More, Seyssel and Machiavelli, in ACTION AND CONVICTION IN EARLY
MODERN EUROPE 19 (1969).
15. Id. at 28.
16. D. ERASMUS, INSTITUTIO PRINCIPIS CHRISTIANI (Basel 1516).
command not one instant longer than his subjects wish. Since kings,
not their own masters, rule on sufferance, why are they proud?"'
1
It is evident that such epigrams-and there are at least a dozen of
them-were not merely conventional exercises in classical genre. It
should be recalled that in his translations from Lucian, written with
Erasmus, it was the dialogue Tyrannicida8 that attracted More's
most explicit interest, and that it was he who proposed that they both
write replies to it in which they would reflect on the position of the
tyrant in the community. More informative yet is the History of King
Richard HI,19 whose editor has noted More's constant return in these
years to the contrast between the good king and the tyrant.20 In fact,
this contrast is the artistic frame of the whole because Rastell's
version opens with the idyllic account of the last years of the "good
king" Edward IV:
He was a goodly parsonage, and very Princely to behold, of hearte
couragious, politique in counsaile .... In whych tyme of hys latter
daies, thys Realm was in quyet and prosperous estate: no feare of
outewarde enemyes, no warre in hande, nor none towarde, but such as
no manne looked for: the people towarde the Prynce, not in a
constrayned feare, but in a wyllynge and louynge obedyence: amonge
them selfe, the commons in good peace.
2'
These are the benefits bestowed by the rule of a virtuous prince:
peace and order in both outward and domestic affairs. In the rest of
Richard 1I, Richard's contrary example, his deceit and his selfish
ambition, sow the seeds of internal discord and finally of his own
downfall, and the commons emerge as the witnesses, the victims, and
also the judges of his abusive rule. They are the repository of political
conscience and moral order, and their comment helps to demonstrate
"the rational man's incipient moral victory over the tyrant's min-
ion,"' 22 just as their loving obedience to Richard's predecessor had
been the validation of his virtuous rule.
There is no evidence to suggest that More's ideas of constitutional-
ism departed at all significantly from the views of Fortescue, whom
he certainly knew. He presumably believed in the dominium
politicum et regale, and there is never any suggestion that for him,
hereditary right plays any part in the legitimation of royal power.
More's characteristic concern is with the abuse and the restraint of
power, and this concern is accompanied by an icy vision of the prac-
17. T. MORE, The Latin Epigrams No. 103, in THE LATIN EPIGRAMS OF THOMAS
MORE 175 (1953).
18. LUCIAN, Tyrannicida, in LUcIANI OPuscuLA (London 1506).
19. T. MORE, History of King Richard III, in 2 WORKS, note 2 supra (1963).
20. Sylvester, Introduction to 2 WORKS, supra note 2, at xvii, xcix (1963).
21. T. MORE, History of King Richard III, in 2 WORKS, supra note 2, at 4 (1963).
22. Kincaid, The Dramatic Structure of Sir Thomas More's History of King
Richard III, in ESSENTIAL ARTICLES FOR THE STUDY OF THOMAS MORE 379 (1977).
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ticalities of statecraft that yields nothing to Machiavelli. For exam-
ple, it is that same populace in Richard 1I7 that provides the most
famous single comment on politics to be found in More's writings,
that the public pretenses and deceits of the rulers are
[k]ynges games, as it were stage playes, and for the more part plaied
upon scafoldes. In which pore men be but ye lokers on. And thei yt
wise be, wil medle no farther. For they that sometyme step up and
playe w t them, when they cannot play their partes, they disorder the
play & do themself no good.
23
In Utopia, the natural and immediate sequel to this work, we find
this vein of radical scepticism about the moral credentials of king-
ship vastly enlarged to a profound and almost startling pessimism. At
the same time the commonalty, the passive repository of political
virtue in Richard III, emerges in Utopia as the sovereign people.
Donald Kelley has recently written that More's "vision of politics,"
like that of Erasmus but unlike that of Seyssel or of Machiavelli,
draws on private values and morality rather than on practical state-
craft or institutional traditions.2 4 I hesitate to agree because I think it
draws heavily on his political experience and because Utopia is
misdescribed as a vision of politics of the same order as The Prince or
even the Institutio principis Christiani. It is a static world-indeed,
one out of time-which is meant to illuminate and to judge, as a
parable would do, the realities of society and state in More's day. It
reveals an individual and extremely passionate conviction of sweep-
ing moral disorder, a disorder that discredits by implication many of
the traditional structures of restraint, including his own profession
of the law. We find here the key to More's luminous yet eccentric
career as a public servant and to the intellectual developments that
would lead to his final stand.
The best of the modem work on More has made clear something
that could always be perceived in his spiritual writings: More's tend-
ency always to stand outside the sphere of practical activity even
while deeply immersed in it. It is impossible not to connect this
tendency with the deep crisis in his life when he seriously contem-
plated his vocation as a Carthusian. The More who lived in the
London Charterhouse for some four years while qualifying for ad-
mission to the bar, reading at Furnivall's Inn and lecturing on Augus-
23. T. MORE, History of King Richard III, in 2 WORKS, supra note 2, at 81
(1963).
24. Kelley, The Conscience of the King's 'Good Servant,' 52 THOUGHT 293,
298-99 (1977).
tine's City of God, always felt the full appeal and authority of the
traditional religious values for which the Carthusian vocation stood.
At the same time, he was formed by his intellectual training in the
preoccupations of the world of humanism, with its strong impulse
toward a lay vocation in the expanding enterprise of urban Europe.
In the midst of his vocational decision, More wrote to his spiritual
advisor, John Colet: "For in the city what is there to move one to live
well? ... [W]hen a man is straining in his own power to climb the
steep path of virtue, it turns him back by a thousand devices and
sucks him back by its thousand enticements. "25 In the end, More
decided to make his own the problem of "living well" in the city of
man, the problem which was also the chief concern of the Christian
humanists who looked to classical culture for a fresh sense of the
European community in their own day. More looked there, too, but
the models that gripped him most seemed always to be Christian and
medieval.
Let us return to Utopia. As a mirror to Europe, it is an elective
polity which is secure from the hazards of hereditary monarchy and
dynastic wars. It is urban rather than rural, without the privileges
and attendant problems of a landed aristocracy. Constitutionally, it
is a federation of city-states, like the Burgundian Netherlands in
which the work was written. The head of the state is a governor,
chosen for life by a senate representing an electorate of families, from
a short list of four men directly nominated by the people. In this and
in all other respects, the society of Utopia is democratic, communal,
and patriarchal, and it is not so remote from institutional traditions
as Donald Kelley has perhaps implied.26 A recent analyst 27 has point-
ed out how nearly it resembles the familial and elective polities of the
European monastic tradition, and he sees behind Utopia the dim
outlines of the Charterhouse. At the foundation of More's ideal com-
munity, however, is the family itself, nurtured by the peculiar in-
stitutions and customs of Utopia. The citizens are brought up in a life
of perfect probity and virtue, and the health of the polity ultimately
resides only in the people.
In recent years, following J.H. Hexter's important discussion 28 of
the different circumstances surrounding the composition of the two
books of Utopia, scholars have tended to look to Book I and the
"Dialogue of Counsel" 29 to find More's comment on practical politics.
25. ST. THOMAs MORE: SELECTED LETTERS 4 (E. Rogers ed. 1961).
26. See Kelley, The Conscience of the King's 'Good Servant,' 52 THOUGHT 293
(1977).
27. Fenlon, England and Europe: Utopia and Its Aftermath, in 25 TRANSAC-
TIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 115 (1975).
28. Hexter, The Composition of Utopia, in 4 WORKS, supra note 2, at xv.
29. Id., at xix-xx.
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Book II, the account of Utopia itself, is commonly seen as an essay on
a natural law society, or a polity of reason untouched by the Chris-
tian revelation. In the words of Father Surtz, "the Utopian temple
with all its accouterments stands ready as if waiting for the Christian
liturgy to begin."30 In one form or another such an opinion has been
held ever since the work of R.W. Chambers.
31
While I do not think it is wrong, I think that More would be
surprised by such an emphasis. When Utopia was written, More was
on the verge of accepting a place in the royal council. This decision
was implicit in his early decision to live in society as a married
layman. The debate must have called up the emotions of the earlier
crisis, however, as well as the fundamental issues he debated at that
time. In Utopia he made these issues universal-a comment on the
Christian vocation of the whole of Europe. It was a brilliant personal
effort to move the educated classes of Europe toward the enlightened
moral perspective of Utopia's citizens. It appears that education was
to More the bottom line in the restraint of power and the rectification
of the social order. We have long taken seriously his passionate
denunciation of social injustice in Book I; we must now acknowledge
in the work an equally radical judgment on government.
It is important to recall that in Book I, the essential condition for a
truly just and moral society is impossible of attainment: It is the
symbolically difficult abolition of private property, which (we are
told) exists in only one place-Nowhere. I do not find this an opti-
mistic work. I think, on the contrary, that it shows that More's
scepticism about the effectiveness of traditional institutions and
remedies extended even to secular positive law and to courtly society.
The traditional institutions for the restraint of royal power were
rooted in the interests of those propertied classes whose abuse of
wealth and power he so unmistakably and bitterly attacked, and in
the proceedings of the law he so much distrusted. Because of this
scepticism, More, like so many before him but with more poignancy
and outward desperation than any, saw the character of the Prince
and his advisors as the central issue, the fulcrum of any attempt to
curb tyranny and to reform the social order through the state. After
the publication of Utopia, his further contribution was to accept the
role of advisor to those in power, especially the King, whose charac-
ter he knew so well. He had little choice; his conscience drove him to
30. E. SURTZ, THE PRAISE OF WISDOM 308 (1957).
31. R. CHAMBERS, THOMAS MORE (1935).
take the risk. His conclusion is expressed by the More of the dialogue,
who argues that "you must not abandon the ship in a storm because
you cannot control the winds."32 It is staunch, but less than a clarion
call to action.
This less familiar view of More makes better sense of his life. A
man who held the views I have described could not be a careerist, and
now we know that More was not. He could be, as he was, a philoso-
pher and man of letters who from personal conviction worked hard
and brilliantly at particular tasks set for him by the King. As Henry's
trusted friend he had an opportunity to affect one of the two polar
extremes of English society where he thought there lay hope of
renewal-the court and the commons. A condition for the evangelical
education of the latter, of course, was peace, and it is suitable that
More should have found his role in government in the twin services of
private counsel to the King at home and of diplomatic service abroad.
He lived in a spirit of Christian hope, and he was an ironist. His view
of human nature was far less sanguine than that of most of his
humanist cronies. He was neither the first nor the last to combine a
low estimate of the human condition with a profound belief in human
worth.
Consider, then, the changing circumstances of the country during
his career in office. The Treaty of Cambrai, which he helped to
negotiate, brought Europe peace on terms that were a defeat for
English interests as commonly conceived, though not as More
conceived them. The spread of the Lutheran heresy threatened the
moral foundation of the social order to which he attached so much
importance and in a way he had never forseen. These events led him
to a reappraisal of the nature of the Christian church in which the
papacy emerged as the indispensable and even divinely sanctioned
center of unity. The King's use of Parliament and state to disrupt this
unity further toppled one of the barriers to disorder that the tradi-
tional constitution provided and did it in a way consistent with the
theory of this constitution. It is not surprising, then, that More's last
weeks in office were so much devoted to the protection of the clerical
estate despite the fact that he had never been a clerically minded
layman. It was natural that it was the Submission of the Clergy in
May of 153233 that precipitated his resignation.
We must assume that More was not greatly surprised at the inabil-
ity of the traditional institutions to correct the policy of a king
obstinately set upon what More regarded as a fatal course for the
nation. It is in keeping with all we know about More that he would
32. T. MORE, Utopia, in 4 WORKS, supra note 2, at 99.
33. J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII 297-300 (1968).
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have defined the great issue so carefully, and that his opposition
between an Act of Parliament and the universal law of Christendom
still obtains as the ground of all debate on the King's Great Matter.
His decision to die for his conviction was, like the Utopia itself, a
decision to instruct the commonalty with the best means at his dis-
posal. It was a gesture admonitory, inspiring, and superbly achieved.
It is fitting therefore to leave the final words on More's stand in
restraint of power to the present Dean of Westminster, Dr. Edward
Carpenter, who wrote as follows in the London Times of February 7,
1978, the 500th anniversary of More's birth:
In making his stand "on a narrow base", More claimed to represent
the vast majority of Christian men present as well as past yet basic-
ally he was asserting the final right of the individual conscience to
authenticate itself, even when this meant to "defy power which
seemed omnipotent". In this he links himself up with Socrates before
him and prisoners of conscience after him. On the courageous witness
of such men the preservation of liberty must finally depend.
34
34. THE TIMES (London), Feb. 7, 1978, at 6, col. 4.

